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FOR THE CIVIL PRACTITIONER
REVIEW OF FOURTH CIRCUIT OPINIONS
IN CIVIL CASES
DECIDED NOVEMBER 1, 1991 THROUGH
DECEMBER 31, 1992
This is a collection of summaries of significant federal civil cases decided
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit during the
fourteen months ended December 31, 1992. Members of the faculty of the
Washington and Lee University School of Law wrote or reviewed the
following summaries except the bankruptcy summaries, which Richard L.
Wasserman, Esq. and Myriam J. Schmeil, Esq. of the law firm of Venable,
Baetjer and Howard in Baltimore, Maryland prepared.
I. ADNsm iw E LAW AND PROCEDURE
Written by PROFESSOR BRiAN C. MURCHISON
A. Deference to Agency Interpretation
In Maryland Department of Human Resources v. USDA, 976 F.2d 1462
(4th Cir. 1992), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
held that the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) permissibly
interpreted the Food Stamp Act of 1977, 7 U.S.C. sections 2011-2032, in
promulgating regulations governing the agency's evaluation of state proposals
submitted to the USDA under the state-federal food stamp program. Re-
versing the district court, the Fourth Circuit invoked judicial deference to
an administrative agency's statutory interpretation, based on the modem
landmark case of administrative law, Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (establishing two-step
analytical framework for judicial review of agency interpretation of statutes).
In its 1985 and 1986 sessions, the Maryland General Assembly approved
welfare increases for poor people. The legal characterization of the state
increases became all-important. If the grants were merely general welfare
increases, they would be considered "income" for purposes of calculating a
recipient's eligibility or benefit level for food stamps under the Food Stamp
Act. If, however, the grants were "energy assistance," they would be
excluded from income. Pursuant to the Maryland General Assembly's des-
ignation of the increases as "energy assistance," the Maryland Department
of Human Resources, which administers the state-federal Food Stamp Pro-
gram in Maryland, sought permission from the USDA, which oversees the
Food Stamp Program nationwide, to exclude Maryland's new payments from
income calculations. The USDA declined, labeling the Maryland grants
general inflationary welfare increases and not bona fide "energy assistance"
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payments. The USDA relied on its own regulation which listed factors for
evaluating the purpose of a state welfare increase.
Determining whether the agency's regulation was consistent with the
Food Stamp Act necessitated an application of Chevron. However, the Fourth
Circuit's analysis demonstrated that review of an agency's statutory inter-
pretation under the two-step Chevron test is anything but predictable. The
magistrate and the federal trial judge had disposed of the case at Chevron's
"Step One": inspection of legislative history disclosed congressional intent
on the precise question at issue. This obviated any need to advance to Step
Two's analysis of whether the agency's interpretation was rational and thus
merited "deference." The Fourth Circuit, on the other hand, appeared to
treat the case as a "Step Two" case. The court strongly implied that Step
One involves inspection of the statute's "actual language" alone, unaided
by reference to legislative history. 976 F.2d at 1472. Because the Food Stamp
Act by its terms did not explicitly address the precise question at issue, the
court proceeded to Step Two's question of rationality. Only at Step Two
did the court consider legislative history.
Here, the court found that the statutory interpretation upon which the
USDA based its regulation was "firmly" grounded in a rational reading of
legislative history. 976 F.2d at 1472. The lower court, which had read the
statute quite differently, suffered from a "fundamental misunderstanding of
the legislative record," "overlooked or misconstrued the most relevant evi-
dence of congressional intent," and relied on "selective, general comments
by individual legislators instead of directly relevant and highly specific
passages...." Id. at 1473.
Perhaps the fundamental difference between the Fourth Circuit's decision
and the decisions below was not so much a dispute over when to consider
legislative history-at Step One or Step Two-or a dispute over how to read
legislative history-"selective[ly]" for its "tidbits," or "properly" for its
"directly relevant" passages. 976 F.2d at 1473. The key difference was likely
over the appropriate judicial role with respect to the subject matter of the
case. As the court noted, quoting from a 1990 case, "'Judicial deference is
especially appropriate in the area of welfare administration."' Id. at 1470
(quoting Mowbray v. Kozlowski, 914 F.2d 593, 598 (4th Cir. 1990)).
B. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
In Darby v. Kemp, 957 F.2d 145 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct.
404 (1992), the Fourth Circuit held that an individual who had been debarred
by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) of the Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD) from entering into transactions with HUD and
other executive agencies must exhaust the administrative appeal process within
the agency before filing suit in federal district court. HUD officials charged
a real estate developer with devising a scheme to circumvent agency rules
governing HUD's single-family and multi-family mortgage insurance pro-
grams. After an administrative hearing, the ALJ debarred the developer
from virtually all nonprocurement transactions with executive agencies for
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eighteen months. Although the developer, pursuant to HUD regulations,
could have petitioned the Secretary of HUD for review of the ALJ's initial
decision, the developer proceeded immediately to bring suit in federal district
court, seeking a declaration that the debarment was statutorily and consti-
tutionally infirm. In a motion to dismiss, HUD argued that the developer
was obliged to exhaust the administrative appeal process. The district court
denied the motion. The Fourth Circuit unanimously reversed, holding that
while the HUD regulation establishing the process for petitions for review
"does not expressly mandate exhaustion of administrative remedies prior to
filing suit," exhaustion is nonetheless required as a matter of administrative
law. 957 F.2d at 148.
The court noted that no exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine applied.
A mere "unsupported allegation" that exhaustion would be "futile" was
insufficient to excuse the developer from the requirement. 957 F.2d at 147-
48 (citing Thetford Properties IV Ltd. Partnership v. HUD, 907 F.2d 445,
450 (4th Cir. 1990)). Nor was the "adequacy" of the administrative remedy
problematic; although the Secretary of HUD has thirty days within which
to decide whether to grant review, has discretion to extend that period, and
may also extend the regulatory deadline for reaching a decision once review
is granted, the court found the agency process adequate, absent "a showing
that the Secretary has failed, or will fail, to act within a reasonable period
of time." Id. at 148. Finally, although application of the exhaustion doctrine
would bar judicial review of the merits because the developer had missed
the deadline for filing the petition for review, this circumstance failed to
trouble the courd: "Darby, by strategic decision or otherwise, allowed the
filing period to pass." Id.
The court's decision reaffirms the importance of the "rule of judicial
administration that even when a statute does not impose an explicit directive,
exhaustion is still required." 957 F.2d at 147 (citing Holcombe v. Colony
Bay Coal Co., 852 F.2d 792, 795 (4th Cir. 1988)). More importantly, the
case signals that the Fourth Circuit will not lightly seize upon exceptions to
that rule, even in an instance of significant agency action against an indi-
vidual, such as debarment.
Aspects of the exhaustion doctrine presented two issues in Nealon v.
Stone, 958 F.2d 584 (4th Cir. 1992). The Fourth Circuit first held that a
civilian Army employee bringing suit in federal court against the Secretary
of the Army under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
sections 2000e to e-17, first must exhaust the administrative process estab-
lished by regulation, 29 C.F.R. section 1613.214(a)(1)(i)-contact the Army's
Equal Employment Opportunity counselor within thirty days of the incident
in question. The district court thus properly dismissed the Title VII claim
of a plaintiff who had failed to take this step.
Some solace for plaintiffs under these circumstances may be found in
the Fourth Circuit's willingness to examine the applicability of equitable
tolling principles because the thirty-day exhaustion requirement is "akin to
a statute of limitations." 958 F.2d at 590 n.4. However, such principles
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were found inapplicable to the facts of Nealon. Solace may be found, too,
in the court's comment that Nealon had mistakenly "failed to raise the issue
of a continuing violation with respect to her Title VII claim below," id., to
avoid the exhaustion problem.
An additional issue was whether the plaintiff was required to exhaust
her second Title VII claim-that the Army had retaliated against her for
filing administrative charges-at the agency level before bringing the claim
to federal court. Following the rule of other circuits, the Fourth Circuit held
that "a separate administrative charge is not prerequisite to a suit complaining
about retaliation for filing the first charge." 958 F.2d at 590 (citing Malhotra
v. Cotter & Co., 885 F.2d 1305, 1312 (7th Cir. 1989)). After adopting the
nonexhaustion rule, the court noted that attainment of one of the goals of
exhaustion in the context of Title VII and Equal Pay Act claims-conciliation
with the employer-would be unlikely in the circumstances of this case.
C. Age Discrimination-Sufficiency of Evidence
In a civil enforcement suit brought by the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission (EEOC)'pursuant to section 7(b) of the Age Discrimi-
nation in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. section 626(b),
EEOC v. Clay Printing Co., 955 F.2d 936 (4th Cir. 1992), the Fourth Circuit
affirmed a district court's grant of summary judgment for the defendant.
The EEOC's suit had alleged ADEA violations on behalf of twenty-three
claimants. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendant
on all twenty-three claims, and the agency appealed nine claims to the Fourth
Circuit. In a 2-1 decision, the court affirmed summary 'Judgment on the
grounds of insufficient evidence of age discrimination. "[W]hat is really
before this court," the court stated, "is a vain attempt by the EEOC to
create a triable issue of age discrimination out of little more than thin air."
955 F.2d at 944. In a footnote, the court appeared to question the agency's
tactics, noting that "the EEOC sought many of the claimants out and
encouraged them to file charges . . . ." Id. at 944 n.6.
Three factors militated in favor of summary judgment. The court high-
lighted the "admission under oath" of each claimant that "he (she) could
not identify any statement or evidence of age discrimination in any of [the
defendant's] employment decisions." 955 F.2d at 941. In addition, the court
stated that "the limited statistical evidence" suggested "anything but a youth
movement" at the defendant's firm. Id. Finally, the court discounted alleg-
edly discriminatory statements because they "were not directly related to any
particular person, employment decision or pattern of decisionmaking." Id.
A sharp dissent noted that the court's first and second reasons should not
be "dispositive on summary judgment when there is conflicting evidence in
the record," and maintained that the third reason "appears to misconstrue
critical aspects of the record." Id. at 949.
D. Judicial Review of Agency Determination
Doyle v. Arlington County School Board, 953 F.2d 100 (4th Cir. 1991),
involved the scope of judicial review of findings of fact made by a state
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administrative hearing officer pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. sections 1400-1485. Parents of a learning
disabled child asked the Arlington County School Board to place their child
in a private school and pay the child's tuition and school expenses for the
next academic year. When the school system countered with a proposal to
place the child in a public school program, the parents requested an admin-
istrative hearing. A local hearing officer took evidence, heard testimony, and
ruled for the parents. On appeal, a State Board of Education reviewing
officer ruled for the school system that the "mandates of the [IDEA]" had
been met by the system's plan for the child. 953 F.2d at 102. In particular,
the reviewing officer disagreed with the local hearing officer on the credibility
of one of the parents' witnesses. Concluding that the witness "saw her role
as that of an advocate," the reviewing officer discredited the witness's
testimony, without having "seen or heard" the witness testify. Id. at 104.
The district court, which was required to make "an independent decision
based on a preponderance of the evidence, while giving due weight to state
administrative proceedings," id. at 103 (citations omitted), affirmed the
reviewing officer's decision.
The Fourth Circuit held that the "due weight" which the district court
was to give the reviewing officer's decision in this case was precisely "none."
953 F.2d at 104. The reviewing officer's decision to discredit the testimony
of the parents' witness, "in the face of the crediting of the same witness by
a hearing officer who had seen and heard the witness testify," was a
significant departure "from the accepted norm of a fact-finding process
designed to discover truth." Id. The Fourth Circuit held that in IDEA cases
findings of fact made by hearing officers "in a regular manner and with
evidentiary support are entitled to presumptive validity ... akin to the
traditional sense of permitting a result to be based on such fact-finding, but
not requiring it." Id. at 105. Where a district court chooses not to follow
such findings of fact, that court "is required to explain why it does not."
Id. "After giving the administrative fact-findings such due weight, if any,
the district court then is free to decide the case on the preponderance of the
evidence, as required by [IDEA]." Id. In the instant case, the Fourth Circuit
found that the reviewing officer's findings were entitled to no weight and
that the hearing officer's findings were "entitled to primafacie correctness."
Id.
The court linked its decision to traditional notions that the crediting of
witnesses by triers of fact and the findings made thereby should not be
disregarded without explanation. The court's care with respect to the hearing
officer's findings seems consistent with the IDEA's requirement that "the
education of each disabled child be tailored to the needs of that child." 953
F.2d at 106.
E. Social Security Disabilities-New and Material Evidence
Wilkins v. Secretary, Department of Health & Human Services, 953 F.2d
93 (4th Cir.) (en banc), rev'g 925 F.2d 769 (4th Cir. 1991), involved a
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claimant's appeal from an Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ's) decision
under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. sections 401-433. Having
been denied disability insurance benefits (DIB) by the ALJ, the claimant
sought review by the Appeals Council, including consideration of a treating
physician's letter relevant to the date of the claimant's disability status. One
question was whether Social Security Administration regulations governing
the review authority of the Appeals Council, 20 C.F.R. section 404.970,
required the Appeals Council to consider the letter in deciding whether to
grant review of the ALJ's decision.
The court en banc, parting from the unanimous panel's interpretation
below, concluded that "the plain wording" of the regulations does require
the Appeals Council to "consider new and material evidence relating to the
period on or before the date of the ALJ decision in deciding whether to
grant review." 953 F.2d at 95. The court then found that the letter conformed
to these requirements, that the Appeals Council did consider the letter in
deciding whether to grant review, and that the letter became part of the
"record as a whole" for purposes of judicial review. Id. at 96. In the
absence of "persuasive contrary evidence," the physician's retrospective
opinion expressed in the letter was entitled to "great weight." Id. The court
concluded that "on this record" the decision denying the DIB claim was
not supported by substantial evidence. Id.
F. FAA-Environmental Impact Findings
In North Carolina v. FAA, 957 F.2d 1125 (4th Cir. 1992), the Fourth
Circuit upheld a final rule of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
initiated at the request of the United States Navy. The rule altered and
redesignated three special use airspace areas restricted for military activities
over eastern North Carolina. Use of the areas involved practice bombing
and laser-guided standoff weapons training; environmental concerns included
"noise from the aircraft, the danger to wildlife, and the danger from the
use of lasers. . . ." 957 F.2d at 1130. The State of North Carolina's legal
challenge included allegations that in promulgating the rule the FAA violated
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. sections
4321-4347, and implementing regulations of the Council on Environmental
Quality (CEQ), 40 C.F.R. sections 1500-1517.
In response to the State's charge that the FAA had blindly adopted the
Navy's environmental review documents without independent study, the court
found that the FAA's actions-reviewing the Navy's assessment and issuing
its own "finding of no significant impact" (FONSI) on the environment-
were adequate to meet the requirements of NEPA and the CEQ regulations.
957 F.2d at 1130. The court also held that the FAA was not arbitrary in
omitting an analysis of the "cumulative impact" of existing and proposed
special use airspace areas in eastern North Carolina when such an analysis
would be part of a forthcoming Marine Corps environmental impact state-
ment covering other military operations proposed for the region. Id. at 1131.
In addition, the court held that the FAA's refusal to prepare its own
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environmental impact statement was not arbitrary and capricious because
the FAA adopted a detailed environmental review by the Navy, and contro-
versy concerning cumulative environmental impact would be addressed in
the Marine Corps' forthcoming report. Id. at 1131-34.
G. EPA- Veto of Dredge and Fill Permit
In James City County v. EPA, 955 F.2d 254 (4th Cir. 1992), the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) had vetoed a decision by the Army
Corps of Engineers granting a permit to James City County to place fill for
the construction of a dam. Facing water shortages for its growing population,
the County had sought the permit in order to construct a water reservoir.
The EPA's veto decision cited adverse environmental effects of the proposed
project as well as a finding that less environmentally damaging alternatives
existed. A district court overturned the EPA's veto on grounds that the
agency erred in concluding that alternatives were available to the County.
The district court then declined to remand the matter to the agency and
ordered the Army Corps of Engineers to issue the permit.
The Fourth Circuit upheld the district court's decision to overturn the
veto. Using the "substantial evidence" standard of review of the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. section 706(2)(E), the court determined that
the EPA's finding that the County had practicable alternative water sources
lacked sufficient support in the record. 955 F.2d at 259. The "substantial
evidence" test thus prompted a judicial hard look at the agency's rationale,
rather than wholly deferential rubber-stamping of administrative conclusions.
The court parted from the district court opinion, however, in deciding to
remand the matter to the EPA for further proceedings, specifically to enable
the agency to consider whether its additional reservation about the dam-
adverse environmental effects-"would alone justify a veto." Id. at 260.
Recognizing that remands often result in harmful delay, the court stated
that it would hold the EPA to its counsel's promise at oral argument that
the agency would act within sixty days.
H. National Environmental Policy Act- "Major Federal Action"
In Sugarloaf Citizens Ass'n v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,
959 F.2d 508 (4th Cir. 1992), public interest groups contested the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission's (FERC's) certification of an incinerator as
a qualifying small power production facility under section 210 of the Public
Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA), 16 U.S.C. section 824a-
3. The groups argued that the certification was a "major Federal action"
under National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) section 102, 42
U.S.C. section 4332, and a federal "undertaking" under National Historic
Preservation Act (NHPA) section 106, 16 U.S.C. section 470f, thus triggering
appropriate review that FERC had omitted.
The court evinced no sympathy for the claims. The court first held that
the standard of review of an agency determination that an action is not a
"major Federal action" is "reasonableness under the circumstances." 959
19931
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F.2d at 512 (citations omitted). FERC's determination that its certification
of the incinerator was not a "major Federal action" was deemed reasonable
for several reasons. First, the "ministerial" nature of agency certification
deprived the agency of discretion in the matter and precluded the agency
from considering environmental factors. Id. at 513. Second, FERC had
insufficient control over the project to "federalize" it because the operator
of the incinerator could have constructed the facility without FERC certifi-
cation if it chose to give up the PURPA benefits, and because the agency
provided no federal funding "or other substantial federal assistance" to the
project. Id. at 513-14. Further, because "[t]he standard for triggering NHPA
requirements is similar to that for the triggering of NEPA requirements,"
id. at 515, the NHPA arguments failed as well.
II. ARBrrRATION, LABOR RELATIONS AND EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
Written by PROFESSOR MARK H. GRUNEWALD
A. Federal Agencies-Duty to Bargain
In Social Security Administration v. Federal Labor Relations Authority,
956 F.2d 1280 (4th Cir. 1992), the Fourth Circuit held that the Federal
Service Labor-Management Relations Statute (FSLMRS), 5 U.S.C. sections
7101-7135, does not impose upon federal agencies a duty to bargain over
union proposals made during the term of a collective bargaining agreement.
The case arose, when during the term of its collective bargaining agreement
with the Social Security Administration (SSA), the American Federation of
Government Employees (AFGE) proposed the payment of relocation expenses
for employees who relocated as the result of promotion from within the
SSA, a subject on which the agreement was silent. The SSA refused to
bargain, and the AFGE filed an administrative complaint with the Federal
Labor Relations Authority (FLRA). The FLRA concluded that the SSA's
refusal to bargain constituted an unfair labor practice. On review, the court
ruled that while an FLRA decision was generally entitled to "considerable
deference," 956 F.2d at 1283, its examination of the language and design
of the statute as a whole made clear that the FLRA interpretation was
incorrect. The court acknowledged that the language of the statute did not
deal with the issue of mid-term union proposals, but found the statutory
language requiring the agency to bargain for the purpose of "arriving at a
collective bargaining agreement" suggested that post agreement bargaining
was not required. Id. at 1284 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 7114(a)(4) (1988)). The court
found confirmation for this view in the language of the statute that explicitly
required the Agency to bargain over the "impact and implementation" of
changes in employment it made mid-term. Id. The court also found support
for its conclusion in the legislative history of the statute and rejected a
contrary conclusion of the District of Columbia Circuit on the ground that
it had relied too heavily on private sector labor law precedent which requires
such bargaining. Finally, the court expressed the view that to conclude that
the FSLMRS duty to bargain extended to union-initiated mid-term proposals
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would jeopardize the overriding goal of the statute to protect the 'para-
mount right of the public to as effective and efficient a Government as
possible."' Id. at 1288 (quoting H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1717, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 154 (1978), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL SERVICE
LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS STATUTE, TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL SERVICE
REFORM ACT OF 1978 793, 822 (Comm. Print 1979)).
B. Preemption
In Richardson v. Kruchko & Fries, 966 F.2d 153 (4th Cir. 1992), the
Fourth Circuit held that the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29
U.S.C. sections 151-187, preempts a tort action by a former employee against
the legal counsel of her former employer for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress or intentional interference with business relations. The plaintiff
alleged that the law firm advised her employer to discharge her for union
activity. The court viewed the former employee's claims an "artfully pleaded,"
966 F.2d 158, attempt to avoid the general preemption standard of the
NLRA which precludes state regulation of conduct "'actually or arguably'
protected ... or 'prohibited' by federal statute. Id. at 156 (citations
omitted). The Fourth Circuit reasoned that to address either of the former
employee's tort claims, a court would have to determine whether her dis-
charge was an "unfair labor practice" under the NLRA-a question reserved
by the preemption doctrine to the National Labor Relations Board to avoid
the risk of undermining national policy through inconsistent state-law judg-
ments. Id. at 158. The court recognized that under its ruling the plaintiff
would be limited to the process and remedies of the NLRA as against her
former employer and would not be able to attack the allegedly tortious
conduct of the law firm. The court nevertheless concluded that to depart
from the preemption doctrine when a plaintiff sought to use state law against
a defendant who could not be reached under the NLRA would create an
intolerably large exception that could disrupt important relationships such
as, in this case, the attorney-client relationship. Accordingly, the Fourth
Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint.
C. Fair Labor Standards Act-Overtime
In Wilson v. City of Charlotte, 964 F.2d 1391 (4th Cir. 1992) (en banc),
the Fourth Circuit held by a vote of 7-6 that in a state that prohibits
collective bargaining by governmental units with their employees, a union of
public employees is not the "representative" of the employees for the
purposes of section 7(o) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA),
29 U.S.C. section 207(o). Section 7(o) requires cash payment rather than
compensatory time off for overtime hours unless an agreement to the contrary
is reached between the public employer and the "representative" of its
employees. Under the court's view, the city fire fighters had no "represen-
tative" and thus section 7(o), as interpreted in Department of Labor regu-
lations, 29 C.F.R. section. 553.23(a)(1), permitted the public employer to
continue unilaterally a practice of compensatory time off in lieu of cash
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payment. While the majority viewed its construction of 7(o) as necessary to
avoid conflict with state law with respect to public employee collective
bargaining, the dissent saw the role of the representative under 7(o) as simply
the employee representative for arriving at an "agreement," 964 F.2d at
1401, but not a "collective bargaining agreement," Id. at 1402, with the
employer as to which of two regulatory standards-time 'off or cash pay-
ment-would apply. The choice offered by the statute was part of a legislative
compromise after the FLSA was applied again to state and local governmental
employers when the Supreme Court in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985), overruled its 1972 decision in
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), which had found
application of the FLSA to state and local governments unconstitutional.
The Fourth Circuit's decision has the effect of limiting employee participation
in the choice between the two forms of compensation under the federal
wage-hour law in states which restrict public employee collective bargaining-
a subject not directly related to the purposes of the FLSA.
D. Age Discrimination in Employment-EEOC Investigative Authority
In Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. American & Efird
Mills, Inc., 964 F.2d 300 (4th Cir. 1992) (per curiam), the Fourth Circuit
held that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has
statutory authority to investigate possible discrimination under Age Discrim-
ination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) section 7(a), 29 U.S.C. section
626(a), even where the individual charge triggering the investigation is time
barred. A former employee of American & Efird filed a charge with the
EEOC, claiming that the company had discharged him nineteen months
earlier because of his age. Under the ADEA, an individual charge of
discrimination must be filed with the EEOC within six months of the alleged
discriminatory act. The EEOC notified the company of the charge and
requested information about the company's general employment practices
and policies and about the circumstances of the former employee's discharge.
The company refused to provide any of the information on the ground that
the individual charge was time barred. After further efforts to obtain the
information failed, the EEOC issued an administrative subpoena against the
company and ultimately brought an action in federal district court to have
its subpoena enforced.
Relying on EEOC v. Ocean City Police Department, 820 F.2d 1378 (4th
Cir. 1987) (en banc), vacated on other grounds, 486 U.S. 1019 (1988), which
dealt with investigation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the
district court refused to enforce the EEOC subpoena, reasoning that the
EEOC had no authority to investigate a time barred age discrimination
charge. 964 F.2d at 304. The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court decision
and remanded the case, ruling that the general investigatory authority granted
to the EEOC in section 7(a) of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. section 626(a), includes
the power to investigate age discrimination in employment independent of
individual charges. The court distinguished this authority from the investi-
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gatory authority of the EEOC in the cases of race and sex discrimination
under Title VII where the power to investigate is ordinarily dependent upon
the filing of a timely individual charge.
III. BANKRUPTCY
Written by
RIcHARD L. WASSERMAN, ESQ. AND MmmiAm J. SCtMELL, ESQ.
A. Classification of Claims and "Cramdown"
In In re Bryson Properties, XVIII, 961 F.2d 496 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 191 (1992), the Fourth Circuit dealt with a Chapter 11 debtor's
plan of reorganization that provided, among other things, for the separate
classification of a nonrecourse mortgagee's deficiency claim from other
unsecured creditors. See 11 U.S.C. § 1111(b) (1988) (dealing with Chapter
1l's allowance of nonrecourse mortgagee's deficiency claims). In addition,
the plan also allowed the debtor's limited partners to retain their interests
in the partnership in exchange for cash contributions to the debtor. The
bankruptcy court and the district court approved the plan. In reversing, the
Fourth Circuit held that the separate classification of the nonrecourse mort-
gagee's deficiency claim in a case where all unsecured claims would receive
the same distribution treatment under the plan was for the purpose of
manipulating the voting on the plan and, therefore, impermissible.
The Fourth Circuit then addressed the issue of the absolute priority rule
and the "new capital exception." 961 F.2d at 503. While not deciding
whether the new value exception survived under the Bankruptcy Code, the
Fourth Circuit concluded that it would not apply in this case. The debtor's
limited partners' exclusive right to contribute new capital, which in effect
allowed them to purchase the property without the risk of outside potential
buyers, constitutes "property" under 11 U.S.C. section 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) that
was received or retained on account of a prior interest. 961 F.2d at 504-05.
The proposed reorganization plan, which in this case provided the debtor's
limited partners with the exclusive right to contribute and recover new capital
prior to the first mortgagee's recovery of its unsecured claim, was not "fair
and equitable" where the first mortgagee was the only truly impaired creditor.
Id. at 505.
B. Fraudulent Conveyances and Preferences
In In re Jeffrey Bigelow Design Group, Inc., 956 F.2d 479 (4th Cir.
1992), a third party purchased fifty percent of the stock in the debtor in
exchange for a cash payment and the arrangement with a bank for a line
of credit for the benefit of the debtor. Although the third party was the
maker of the line of credit, only the debtor received the draws and all
payments were made directly by the debtor to the bank. After the debtor
filed its bankruptcy petition, the Chapter 7 trustee filed a complaint to
recover payments from the debtor to the bank as fraudulent conveyances
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and/or voidable preferences. With respect to the fraudulent conveyance
claims, the Fourth Circuit determined that all facts taken together did not
lead to the conclusion that actual fraud existed for purposes of 11 U.S.C.
section 548(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, where a debtor made payments
on a line of credit for which its shareholder was the maker but the debtor
received all draws under the line of credit. "Actual fraudulent intent" for
purposes of 11 U.S.C. section 548(a)(1) requires a "subjective evaluation of
the debtor's motives;" an objective determination is not conclusive. 956 F.2d
at 483. In addition, the trustee failed to prove constructive fraud under 11
U.S.C. section 548(a)(2) where reasonably equivalent value was given in
exchange for the payments. The proper focus is the "net effect" of the
transfers on the debtor's estate-the funds available to the unsecured cred-
itors. Id. at 484. Because the transfers by the debtor served simply as
repayment of money it had received, no fraudulent transfer had occurred.
In the course of its analysis, the court cited with approval the so-called
"indirect benefit rule," concluding that the net effect of the transfers at
issue in this case did not deplete the bankruptcy estate. With respect to the
preference claims, the Fourth Circuit applied the Supreme Court's holding
in Union Bank v. Wolas, 112 S. Ct. 527 (1991), and concluded that the
repayments were made in the ordinary course of business and were, therefore,
not avoidable as preferences. 956 F.2d at 486. Although not "commonplace,"
the three party transaction in this case still met the tests of 11 U.S.C. section
547(c)(2). 956 F.2d at 488. Also of interest, the Fourth Circuit in a footnote
expressly declined to comment on viability of the so-called Deprizio "insider
preference" theory. Id. at 483.
C. Automatic Stay
In In re Robbins, 964 F.2d 342 (4th Cir. 1992), the Fourth Circuit dealt
with a Chapter 11 debtor's wife who moved to lift the automatic stay
imposed by 11 U.S.C. section 362 in her husband's bankruptcy case to allow
their state court divorce action to continue. In analyzing whether cause exists
to lift the automatic stay to allow pending state court litigation to continue,
the Fourth Circuit enumerated several factors that courts should consider,
including,
(1) whether the issues in the pending litigation involve only state
law, so the expertise of the bankruptcy court is unnecessary; (2)
whether modifying the stay will promote judicial economy and
whether there would be greater interference with the bankruptcy case
if the stay were not lifted because matters would have to be litigated
in bankruptcy court; and (3) whether the estate can be protected
properly by a requirement that creditors seek enforcement of any
judgment through the bankruptcy court.
964 F.2d at 345. After finding that state courts are uniquely qualified to
determine marital property claims, the Fourth Circuit held that cause existed
to lift the stay to determine the equitable distribution of assets. The court
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stated, however, that the bankruptcy court would retain jurisdiction to later
determine the allowance of the wife's claim against the debtor husband's
estate.
D. Household Goods and Lien Avoidance
In In re McGreevy, 955 F.2d 957 (4th Cir. 1992), a Chapter 7 debtor
filed a motion to avoid a lien on her shotgun and rifle asserting that the
firearms were "household goods" within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. section
522(f)(2)(A). Bankruptcy Code section 522(f) permits a debtor to avoid
certain liens on "household goods" which are held primarily for personal,
family or household use by the debtor or a dependent of the debtor. 11
U.S.C. § 522(f) (1988). The Fourth Circuit rejected the two current definitions
of household goods and formulated a new interpretation of the term, which
explicitly incorporates a requirement that there be a "functional nexus
between the good and the household." 955 F.2d at 961. The court concluded
that the requisite functional nexus did not exist and the lien was, therefore,
not subject to avoidance. The debtor's firearms were not used to support
and facilitate daily life within the home; rather, they were used exclusively
away from the home and curtilage. The Fourth Circuit refused, however, to
adopt a per se rule that firearms can never be household goods under its
newly-adopted definition.
E. Procedure
In In re Serra Builders, Inc., 970 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir. 1992), a Chapter
13 debtor filed a motion to avoid a foreclosure sale of real property as a
fraudulent conveyance. On appeal from the bankruptcy court's grant of
summary judgment to the defendants, the district court dismissed the debtor's
appeal because the debtor did not comply with the procedural requirements
of Bankruptcy Rule 8006, which mandates that an appellant file a designation
of the record on appeal within ten days after filing a notice of appeal. In
this case, the debtor filed its designation of the record fifteen days late. The
Fourth Circuit held that noncompliance with Bankruptcy Rule 8006, without
providing the court with a compelling reason for the delay in filing the
required designation, justified dismissal of the appeal. The court established
the criteria a district court should follow in determining whether to dismiss
a party's bankruptcy appeal for violating Bankruptcy Rule 8006. 970 F.2d
at 1311 (citing J.R. Orgain, Jr. v. Soil Conservation Serv., No. 89-2745,
slip op., 898 F.2d 146, 1990 WL 27359 (4th Cir. 1990)). Specifically, the
court held that a district court must take at least one of the following steps:
"(1) make a finding of bad faith or negligence; (2) give the appellant notice
and an opportunity to explain the delay; (3) consider whether the delay had
any possible prejudicial effect on the other parties; or (4) indicate that it
considered the impact of the sanction and available alternatives." 970 F.2d
at 1311. In this case, the district court found that the appellant failed to
present any compelling reasons for its delay in filing its designation and that
the appellant was negligent with regard to the entire procedural appeals
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process. The appellant's explanation that its attorney was out of the country
was held not to be sufficient.
In In re Nantahala Village, Inc., 976 F.2d 876 (4th Cir. 1992), a Chapter
11 debtor filed suit against a bank alleging breach of contract and fraud.
The bank moved for summary judgment but the debtor did not respond.
Because this was a "non-core" proceeding, the bankruptcy court entered
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
section 157(c)(1) and Bankruptcy Rule 9033 and recommend that the district
court grant the bank's motion for summary judgment. 976 F.2d at 879. The
debtor did not object to the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of
law within the ten-day time period prescribed in Bankruptcy Rule 9033. The
district court adopted the bankruptcy court's recommendation that summary
judgment be granted for the bank and the debtor appealed. The Fourth
Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment and held
that the debtor's failure to file written objections within the ten-day time
period constituted a waiver of its right to appeal from the district court's
adoption of the proposed findings of act and conclusions of law.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Written by PROFESSOR ALLAN P. IDES
A. Due Process-Abolition of Common Law Cause of Action
Dinh v. Rust International Corp., 974 F.2d 500 (4th Cir. 1992), involved
a plaintiff who was injured while working in a brickyard in Virginia. The
pulley portion of a conveyor that had been installed in 1959 caused his
injuries. He sued the parties responsible for the design, manufacture, and
installation of the conveyor. A Virginia statute of repose provided that no
action to recover damages for injuries sustained by a 'defective and unsafe
condition of an improvement to real property' could be brought against
any 'person performing or furnishing the design, planning, supervision of
construction or construction of such improvement ... more than five years
after the performance of such services."' 974 F.2d at 500-01 (quoting VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.01-250 (Michie 1992)). The district court granted summary
judgment for the defendants and the Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court of
appeals held that the Virginia statute of repose applied to the circumstances
of this case, in essence, prospectively abolishing plaintiff's claim against
defendants. The court further held that nothing in the Due Process Clauses
of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments prohibited the prospective abolition
of common law causes of action.
B. Due Process-Land Use
Gardner v. City of Baltimore, 969 F.2d 63 (4th Cir. 1992), involved a
proposed a residential subdivision within the City of Baltimore. After several
years of effort, the City finally granted the necessary permit. At that point,
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however, plaintiff had lost the land through a bankruptcy proceeding.
Plaintiff sued the city and various individuals under 42 U.S.C. section 1983,
claiming a violation of due process and equal protection and a taking without
just compensation. The district court granted a summary judgement for the
defendants on all claims. On appeal, plaintiff challenged only the dismissal
of the due process claim. In essence, plaintiff argued that the permit, to
which he claimed an entitlement, was arbitrarily delayed due to pressure
from influential residents of an adjacent subdivision. The court of appeals
held that plaintiff's substantive due process claim was dependent on whether
plaintiff had a property interest in the permit-whether the permit was an
entitlement within the meaning of the Due Process Clause. In the absence
of an entitlement there is no property interest to be afforded due process.
The key to the entitlement determination is found in the amount of discretion
vested in the issuing body. If the issuing body, here the Planning Commission,
has discretion to deny the permit, there is no entitlement. The court of
appeals found that the Planning Commission did have considerable discretion
to deny the permit. Therefore, the permit was not an entitlement, and the
protection of due process did not attach. Counsel should note that the court
gave a very broad sweep to the concept of discretion in an effort to discourage
due process litigation in the land use context. This curtailment of substantive
due process challenges to land use should not, however, diminish the efficacy
of takings challenges, including those challenges seeking damages for interim
takings.
C. Due Process-No-Notice Evictions from Public Housing
In Richmond Tenants Organization, Inc. v. Kemp, 956 F.2d 1300 (4th
Cir. 1992), the plaintiffs, various individuals and tenant organizations, brought
suit challenging the constitutionality of summary eviction procedures pro-
posed for use against public housing tenants. These procedures would allow
local United States Attorneys the discretion to remove tenants from their
homes without notice upon an ex parte showing "of probable cause to
believe that the property was used to facilitate the violation of drug laws."
956 F.2d at 1302. The party being evicted did not have to be involved in
the drug activity. The Fourth Circuit held that "absent exigent circumstances,
no-notice evictions violate due process." Id. at 1306 (citing United States v.
Premises & Real Property at 4492 South Livonia Road, 889 F.2d 1258 (2d
Cir. 1989)). Ordinarily a tenant must be afforded notice and an opportunity
to be heard prior to the eviction. The court emphasized the substantiality
of the interest at stake, namely, a place to live, and contrasted that interest
with those cases involving the seizure of yachts, cars, or currency, where a
lesser threshold of process was considered adequate. The violation of drug
laws was not deemed to be a sufficient, all-purpose exigent circumstance.
The court of appeals also upheld the district court's issuance of a nationwide
permanent injunction against the use of no-notice evictions by the Department
of Justice. The injunction would, however, permit individual district court
judges the authority to determine if exigent circumstances warranted a no-
notice eviction in any particular case.
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D. Due Process- Termination of Public Employment
In Linton v. Frederick County Board of County Commissioners, 964
F.2d 1436 (4th Cir. 1992), the Frederick County terminated the plaintiffs
employment as its chief of highway operations. On the day before his
termination, he received a two-page, single-spaced memorandum entitled,
"Notice of Dismissal." 964 F.2d at 1436. The Notice described several
specific instances of plaintiff's failure to perform as required; it also included
a more general criticism of plaintiff's management style. Upon receipt of
the Notice, plaintiff was provided a brief opportunity to respond to the
charges. Plaintiff was then given the option of resigning. He was given until
the following morning to decide. After discussing the matter with his family,
plaintiff decided not to resign. His employment was immediately terminated.
Plaintiff was, however, afforded a post-termination administrative appeal.
Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, claiming that the preter-
mination process violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the county
and a panel of the Fourth Circuit unanimously affirmed that decision. The
panel held that when adequate post-termination remedies are available to a
public employee, pretermination due process need meet only minimal re-
quirements of notice and an opportunity to be heard. The, purpose of this
minimal due process is not to resolve the controversy, but merely to provide
a basis for determining if there are reasonable grounds to believe the charges
and to support the proposed action. That minimal standard was satisfied
here. The court also held that the notice was not deficient due to its inclusion
of general criticisms of plaintiff's work along with the specific allegations
of wrongdoing. This was so even though the general criticisms did not in
themselves provide sufficient notice of the underlying charges. Unless the
specific allegations upon which a dismissal is ostensibly based are merely a
subterfuge for dismissing the employee on the inadequately described general
allegations, the inclusion of the general charges will not void an otherwise
valid notice.
E. Equal Protection-Gender Discrimination/Disparate Impact
Austin v. Berryman, 955 F.2d 223 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
2997 (1992), involved Virginia's Unemployment Compensation Act which
excludes from its coverage any person who voluntarily leaves "work with an
employer to accompany or to join his or her spouse to a new locality. .. "
955 F.2d at 225 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 60.2-618 (Michie 1992)). The
plaintiff, who had been denied benefits due to the above provision, filed suit
challenging the constitutionality of the exclusion on equal protection grounds.
She claimed that the statute discriminated on the basis of gender. Her
argument was premised on a claimed disparate impact upon women and upon
an allegation that at least some members of the legislature were aware that
the exclusion would harm more women then men. The court of appeals
rejected both arguments. Disparate impact, standing alone, was not sufficient
to establish gender discrimination. In addition, the court found no evidence
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of covert or invidious discrimination. As to the knowledge of the potential
disparate impact, the court explained that the necessary discriminatory purpose
can be established only by evidence that the decisionmaker acted "because
of" the disparate impact, not "in spite of" the law's potential adverse effects.
Id. at 229 (quoting Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279
(1979)).
F. Equal Protection-School Desegregation
In United States v. Charleston County School District, 960 F.2d 1227
(4th Cir. 1992), the United States filed a civil rights enforcement suit against
the Charleston County School District (CCSD) in 1981. The government
claimed that the CCSD operated a racially segregated school system in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. At
the time the suit was filed, the racial composition of the student population
was fifty-four percent black and forty-six percent white; yet, two-thirds of
the schools within the CCSD were predominantly one race. 960 F.2d at 1239.
After a trial on the merits, the district court found in favor of the CCSD,
concluding that, in fact, the CCSD consisted of eight separate and independent
school districts, the lines for which had not been created for the purpose of
racial segregation. There was apparent agreement among the parties that as
to each constituent school district, intradistrict integration had been achieved.
On appeal, the United States argued that the CCSD was a single school
district and as so construed, district-wide integration had not been achieved.
A split panel of the Fourth Circuit upheld the decision of the district court
with one minor caveat regarding transfers between the constituent districts.
In upholding the lower court's decision, the panel majority gave great
deference to the district court's conclusion that the constituent districts had
not been drawn on racial lines. The dissent, authored by Judge Sprouse, the
sole Fourth Circuit Judge on the panel, noted that the district court's finding
on this point was found in a conclusory footnote to a thirty-one page opinion.
Id. at 1240 (citing United States v. Charleston County School District, 738
F. Supp. 1513, 1519 n.4 (D.S.C. 1990)). He further noted that the conclusion
was unsupported by factual findings and was in tension with a state mandate
in effect at the time the district lines were drawn. That mandate explicitly
required "race-conscious" line drawing of school districts. Id. at 1237. Judge
Sprouse would have remanded to the district court for express findings on
this issue. The dissent also concluded that given the breadth of administrative
responsibilities lodged in the CCSD, there was a single school district. In
general, the panel majority's resolution of race-conscious issues appears to
be somewhat inconsistent with the subsequent decision of the United States
Supreme Court in United States v. Fordice, 112 S. Ct. 2727 (1992), which
held that merely adopting and implementing race-neutral policies to govern
a university system did not necessarily fulfill Mississippi's obligation to abolish
prior de jure segregation.
G. Equal Protection-Race-Based Scholarships
In Podberesky v. Kirwan, 956 F.2d 52 (4th Cir. 1992), the plaintiff, an
hispanic student at the University of Maryland at College Park, was excluded
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on account of his race from consideration for a scholarship program designed
exclusively for black students. This scholarship program was originally adopted
as a partial remedy for the State of Maryland's previously segregated system
of higher education. The plaintiff challenged his exclusion from the program
as violative of the Equal Protection Clause. The district court granted
summary judgment for the University. The court of appeals held that in the
absence of a specific finding that the scholarship program currently remedied
the discernable present effects of the previously segregated system of higher
education, the racial criterion could not withstand strict scrutiny. Because the
district court had made no such finding, the Fourth Circuit reversed and
remanded. Upon remand, the district court must determine whether discern-
able present effects from the prior system of segregation continue to exist
within the University. If, and only if, such present effects still exist and if
the scholarship program operates as a remedy for those lingering effects,
equal protection will be satisfied. A finding of general societal harm will not,
according to the court of appeals, be sufficient to uphold the program. The
decision of the court of appeals is in general accord with the most recent
affirmative action decisions by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., City of Rich-
mond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (striking down minority set-
aside program for city construction contracts because program was not
narrowly tailored to remedy effects of prior discrimination).
H. Freedom of Speech-Retaliatory Demotion
Maciariello v. Sumner, 973 F.2d 295 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 1048 (1993), involved two police officers who conducted a secret,
internal investigation of a superior officer, suspecting him of having tampered
with a videotape of a drunk driving arrest by erasing the picture. The officers
did not report their suspicions to either the Chief of Police or the Assistant
Chief of Police. When the officers' secret investigation was discovered, the
Chief of Police ordered an internal investigation. The internal investigation
revealed that the camera in which the videotape had been recorded was
defective, having failed to record the picture on at least six other videotapes.
The officers were both demoted for failing to report their suspicions and for
conducting an unauthorized investigation. The officers subsequently filed suit
under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, claiming that the demotions were in violation
of their right to freedom of speech, specifically, their right to conduct a
secret investigation. The court of appeals held that the investigation was not
per se speech, but that the officers did engage in "some protected conduct"
in discussing their suspicions with other parties and with one another. 973
F.2d at 299. The court concluded, however, that their was no "but for"
relationship between any of this protected conduct and the demotion. Id. The
officers were not demoted for voicing their suspicions, but for engaging in
an unauthorized, internal investigation. Furthermore, the court concluded that
even if the officers' speech was a factor in the demotion, the city, as a public
employer, had a strong interest in discouraging unauthorized internal inves-
tigations by police officers. That interest outweighed any incidental effect
upon the officers' right to freedom of speech.
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V. ENvmom mNTAL LAW
Selected by* ASSISTANT PRoFESSOR DAvID A. WrTH
A. CERCLA- "Operators"
In Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 377 (1992), the Fourth Circuit dealt with a
contribution action by a current property owner against prior owners and
tenants of the property under section 107 of the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) for costs
incurred in removing underground storage tanks. 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1988).
Section 107(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. section 9607(a)(2), allows a current owner to
recover reimbursement from prior "owners" and "operators" of a "facility"
that engaged in the "disposal" of hazardous waste during their ownership or
operation. First, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that
the previous tenants were not "operators" because they did not have "au-
thority to control" the facility. 966 F.2d at 842. Second, the court of appeals
affirmed the district court's holding that the term "facility" meant only the
portion of the property containing the underground storage tanks-a portion
adjacent to, but separate from, the portion leased by the tenants. Finally,
the court of appeals reversed the district court's restrictive definition of the
term "disposal" with respect to the determination of which of the prior
owners held the property during the release of the hazardous waste. The
Fourth Circuit cited United States v. Waste Industries, Inc., 734 F.2d 159,
164-65 (4th Cir. 1984) in defining "disposal" to include not only active
pollution but also 'completely passive repose or movement through the
environment."' 966 F.2d at 845. Thus, the court ruled that prior owners who
held the property while the storage tanks leaked hazardous waste into the
environment were liable to the plaintiff.
B. CERCLA- "Operators" and Successor Corporation Liability
In United States v. Carolina Transformer Co., 978 F.2d 832 (4th Cir.
1992), the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's holdings that corporate
principals were liable under section 107(a)(2) of the Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Comliensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) as
"operators." 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (1988). The court cited Nurad, Inc. v.
William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 842 (4th Cir. 1992) in defining
."operators" as persons with authority to control a facility's disposal of
hazardous waste. 978 F.2d at 837. The court also affirmed the district court's
holding that a successor corporation that purchased the assets of the old
corporation was liable under section 107(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. section 9607(a)(2).
The court stated the "settled rule" that a successor corporation that purchases
* Professor Wirth helped select these cases for their significance, but he neither wrote
nor reviewed the following summaries which were drafted in their entirety by the Law Review
staff.
1993]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:211
the assets of a liable corporation does not acquire the liabilities of the old
corporation unless: "1) the successor expressly or impliedly agrees to assume
the liabilities of the predecessor; 2) the transaction may be considered a de
facto merger; 3) the successor may be considered a 'mere continuation' of
the predecessor; or 4) the transaction is fraudulent." 978 F.2d at 838. In
interpreting the "mere continuation" exception to the bar on successor
liability, the only exception potentially applicable in this case, the Fourth
Circuit did not follow the traditional test which requires an "identity of
stock, stockholders, and directors between the two corporations." Id. Instead,
the Fourth Circuit approved the district court's use of the "continuity of
enterprise" test which examines the retention of the employees, assets, product
lines, facilities, general operations and whether the new business holds itself
out as constituting the same operation as the old business. Id. Here, the
principals formed the successor corporation only after becoming aware of
potential environmental liability. The successor purchased all the personal
assets of the old corporation, moved to a new facility, hired the same
management and employees, and engaged in a very similar business. The
court found these factors left the "unmistakeable impression that the transfer
of the [old] business to [the new corporation] was part of an effort to
continue the [old] business in all material respects yet avoid the environmental
liability arising from the [hazardous waste disposal]." Id. at 841. Conse-
quently, the successor corporation was a continuation of the old corporation
and was thus liable for response costs and punitive damages.
VI. EviDENCE
Written by PROFESSOR JAMs M. PHimMSTER
Exclusion of Hearsay-Abuse of Discretion
In Precision Piping and Instruments, Inc. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours
& Co., 951 F.2d 613 (4th Cir. 1991) the Fourth Circuit held that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in excluding as hearsay several statements
made by employees of one of the defendants. The statements were offered
by the plaintiff as part of its proof of its claim that defendants violated the
Sherman Act. The district court directed a verdict in favor of the defendants,
and the Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the trial court had
correctly ruled that the statements would have to concern matters within
scope of declarant's employment to be admissible under Federal Rule of
Evidence 801(d)(2)(D) and that the trial court had correctly concluded that
the relevant scope of employment was the authority to hire and fire the
plaintiff. The court further ruled that the trial court had not abused its
discretion when it determined that the speakers did not have the authority to
hire and fire the plaintiff. In one instance, where the speaker did have the
authority to hire and fire and might have been found to have approved of
the underling's comments that he passed on to the plaintiff, the Fourth
Circuit acknowledged the trial court's discretion, including that which exists
under Federal Rule of Evidence 403, to exclude the evidence. The Fourth
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Circuit also ruled that the trial court was within its discretion in deciding
that the plaintiff had failed to establish the existence of a conspiracy that is
a necessary predicate to admitting statements under Federal Rule of Evidence
801(d)(2)(E). A senior district judge sitting by designation concurred in the
court's ruling on several of the statements based upon the trial court's
discretion under Federal Rule of Evidence 403.
FEDERAL CivI, PROCEDURE
Written by AssocIATE PRoFEssoR JoAN M. SHAUGHNEsSY
A. Joinder
In Delta Financial Corp. v. Paul D. Comanduras & Associates, 973 F.2d
301 (1992), plaintiff and defendant had been partners in a limited partnership.
The partnership agreement contained an arbitration provision and this case
arose from an action by plaintiff, Delta Financial Corporation (Delta), against
defendant, Paul D. Comanduras & Associates (PDC), seeking to compel
arbitration. Plaintiff's complaint demonstrated that the relief it sought through
arbitration was a dissolution of the partnership and liquidation of its assets.
The district court granted the motion to compel arbitration and appointed
an arbitrator. The Fourth Circuit vacated the order compelling arbitration
and remanded. The Fourth Circuit held that the district court erred in
compelling arbitration over PDC's objection that one Timothy C. Cranch
was also a partner who should be joined under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
19. The Fourth Circuit reasoned that in an action for liquidation, all partners
entitled to share assets are necessary parties under Federal Rule Civil Proce-
dure 19(a) and, therefore, all partners are also necessary parties in an action
to compel an arbitration seeking the same result. In the course of its opinion,
the court noted that Cranch's joinder would not destroy diversity and did
not reach the question of whether he was an indispensable party under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 19(b). By contrast, the court reached the question
of whether the partnership itself, whose joinder would have destroyed diver-
sity, was an indispensable party and found that it was not. The action, the
court explained, was an internal conflict between the partners. The partnership
itself, in the court's view, had no interest distinct from that of the several
partners.
B. Summary Judgment
In World-Wide Rights Ltd. Partnership v. Combe, Inc., 955 F.2d 242
(4th Cir. 1992), the Fourth Circuit addressed the standard to be applied in
considering cross motions for summary judgment in cases arising under written
contracts. Plaintiff brought an action seeking a declaratory judgment that it
was entitled to royalties from the defendants under a written licensing
agreement. Plaintiff and defendants filed cross-motions for summary judg-
ment, the district court granted summary judgment for defendants, finding
that the written agreement was unambiguous and that plaintiff was not
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entitled to royalties thereunder. The Fourth Circuit reversed. It held first that
the mere fact that both parties have moved for summary judgment does not
establish that summary judgment can be granted under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56. The court went on to describe the inquiry required of a court
in considering a motion for summary judgment on a matter of contract
interpretation. If a written contract is unambiguous on its face, the court
may interpret the contract as a matter of law and grant summary judgment
based upon its interpretation. If, however, the writing is 'susceptible of two
reasonable interpretations,"' id. at 245 (quoting American Fidelity & Casualty
Co. v. London & Edinburgh Ins. Co., 354 F.2d 214, 216 (4th Cir. 1965)), it
is ambiguous and extrinsic evidence of its meaning may be received. The
question for the court on summary judgment in the latter case will be
whether, in light of the extrinsic evidence made part of the record on summary
judgment, there is a genuine issue of fact as to the interpretation of the
contract. If there is such an issue, summary judgment may not be granted.
The Fourth Circuit held that the licensing agreement was not unambiguous,
vacated the district court judgment and remanded for further proceedings.
C. Discovery
In National Union Fire Insurance Co. v. Murray Sheet Metal Co., 967
F.2d 980 (4th Cir. 1992), the Fourth Circuit considered both the scope of
work product protection available under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(b)(3) and the procedure to be followed by district court judges faced with
claims of work product privilege under that rule. Here, a reinsurer, National
Union Fire Insurance Company (National Union), was defending a suit
brought by Arkwright Mutual Insurance Company (Arkwright) for reimburse-
ment of insurance payments made by Arkwright following a fire at a General
Electric plant in West Virginia. National Union subpoenaed documents con-
cerning the fire from Murray Sheet Metal Company (Murray), which had
been renovating the plant at the time of the fire but which was not a party
to the National Union-Arkwright litigation. Murray, refusing to produce
twenty-six subpoenaed documents, provided a log giving the general descrip-
tion, author, date, recipient, custodian and reason for nondisclosure for each
of the twenty-six documents. On the basis of Murray's submission and without
examining the documents, the district court refused to compel production of
any of the documents. The Fourth Circuit reversed, finding that the district
court had conducted an inadequate inquiry into Murray's work product claim.
On remand, the district court was directed to examine the documents and
the circumstances of their preparation before ruling on the work product
claim. The Fourth Circuit also gave a rather restrictive reading of the scope
of work product protection. It noted that documentation is to be expected
following industrial accidents and that such documentation may be prepared,
in part, with the general possibility of litigation in mind. Such documents do
not constitute work product. To meet the work product test of Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3), the court held "[t]he document must be prepared
because of the prospect of litigation when the preparer faces an actual claim
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or potential claim following an actual event or series of events that could
reasonably result in litigation." 967 F.2d at 984 (emphasis in original). The
Fourth Circuit thus questioned, for example, whether documents prepared by
Murray's safety director met this test. The court also read the qualified
protection afforded non-opinion work product -narrowly, describing it as
"little more than an 'anti-freeloader' rule designed to prohibit one adverse
party from riding to court on the enterprise of the other." Id. at 985.
Therefore, the court observed that statements taken immediately after the
fire, and before National Union was notified, might well meet the showing
needed to overcome qualified work product protection.
D. Default Judgments
In Home Port Rentals, Inc. v. Ruben, 957 F.2d 126 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 70 (1992), an earlier suit between the parties resulted in a
consent order allowing a voluntary non-suit without prejudice to the plaintiff
and containing defendants' consent to jurisdiction and appointment of defen-
dants' attorney as their agent for service of process for any new action
brought within 180 days of the consent order. Plaintiff brought a new action
and served defense counsel. Defendants failed to respond to their attorney's
attempt to communicate with them and did not otherwise participate. Even-
tually, defendants' attorney successfully moved to withdraw and the court
entered a default judgment against the defendants. Thereafter, the district
court refused, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60, to relieve the
defendants of the default judgments. The Fourth Circuit affirmed. First, the
court held that, although defendants did not expressly authorize their attorney
to accept service on their behalf, they were aware of his activities in defending
the original action and in negotiating the non-suit. Therefore, the court held
that defendants were bound by the agreement negotiated on their behalf in
which any jurisdictional objections were waived.
Second, the court found that under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
60(b)(1), which provides for relief from judgment for "excusable neglect,"
the intentional acts of defendant Ruben in making himself unavailable con-
stitutes fault justifying the district court's refusal to relieve him from the
default judgment. As to the second defendant, whose motion was made more
than one year after judgment, the Fourth Circuit noted that Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) was not available to circumvent the one year time
limit of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) and upheld the district
court's denial of relief.
E. Statutes of Limitation
In Jane Doe v. John Doe, 973 F.2d 237, (4th Cir. 1992), the Fourth
Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's action to recover
damages against an uncle who had sexually abused her when she was a child.
The Fourth Circuit, construing North Carolina law, found plaintiff's com-
plaint time barred. Two North Carolina statutes were at issue. The first is a
three-year statute of limitations governing claims for emotional distress. N.C.
1993]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:211
GEN. STAT. § 1-52(5) (1992). The Fourth Circuit rejected plaintiff's argument
that the statute should be construed as running from the date she first
discovered the connection between defendant's abuse and her psychological
injury. Refusing to read a discovery provision into this statute, the court held
that the statute began to run when plaintiff reached eighteen years of age.
Alternatively, the court found that the second statute would bar the
action. It reads, "Provided that no cause of action [for personal injury other
than medical malpractice] shall accrue more than 10 years from the last act
or omission of defendant giving rise to the cause of action." N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 1-52(16) (1992). The Fourth Circuit rejected plaintiff's argument that
North Carolina would create a judicial exception to the statutory ten-year
period of repose for child sex abuse cases, as it has done for occupational
diseases. Wilder v. Amatex Corp., 336 S.E.2d 66 (N.C. 1985). The court
predicted that North Carolina would await legislative action, given the difficult
issues of policy posed by sexual abuse actions.
F. Complex Litigation
In re Showa Denko K.K. L-Tryptophan Products Liability Litigation II,
953 F.2d 162 (4th Cir. 1992), involved interlocutory review by the Fourth
Circuit of an administrative order entered in a multidistrict products liability
action. The district court entered an order requiring payment by all persons
in the United States having claims against defendants related to L-Tryptophan
of 1,000 dollars or 0.5 percent of recovery. The payments were to be used
to reimburse the steering committee of plaintiffs' attorneys for the costs of
discovery. With respect to claimants not before the court in the multidistrict
litigation (MDL), the order provided two enforcement mechanisms. First,
defendants were required to certify that assessments had been paid on all
claims settled or on which judgments had been satisfied. Second, the parties
were ordered not to furnish any product of MDL discovery to persons who
had not paid their assessments. The order thus sought to reach plaintiffs in
federal cases not transferred to the MDL, plaintiffs in 683 state court actions
and approximately 180 claimants who had not yet filed suit. The Fourth
Circuit held that the district court lacked power to require assessments and
reversed the order. The Fourth Circuit held, first, that the district court could
not require payments from persons not within its jurisdiction and second,
that the order's attempt to restrict discovery in state court proceedings raised
serious federalism concerns.
VIII. FEDERAL COURTS
Reviewed by PROFESSOR LEwis H. LARuE
Abstention
A good rule of thumb for litigators about absention is: Do not bother
asking a district court to abstain unless the precedents are squarely on point;
if your case is distinguishable, the Fourth Circuit is likely to accept the
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distinction and rule that abstention is improper. The court of appeals recently
corroborated this rule of thumb in three cases: Transdulles Center, Inc. v.
USX Corp., 976 F.2d 219 (4th Cir. 1992); Neufeld v. City of Baltimore, 964
F.2d 347 (4th Cir. 1992); and McLaughlin v. United Virginia Bank, 955 F.2d
930 (4th Cir. 1992).
In Transdulles Center, Inc. v. USX Corp., 976 F.2d 219 (4th Cir. 1992),
the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's refusal to abstain in a case
that involved a breach of contract dispute which centered around the question
of compliance with a subdivision ordinance. The court stated that federal
abstention is proper only where: 1) a determination of state law may moot
a federal constitutional issue or present it in a different posture; 2) the state
court is dealing with state law issues that have substantial policy concerns,
976 F.2d at 223 (citing Colorado River Conservation District v. United States,
424 U.S. 800, 816 (1976)); 3) federal review would impinge on a state's
attempt to "establish a coherent policy" in an area of substantial public
concern, id. (citing New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. New Orleans, 491
U.S. 350, 361 (1989); or 4) parallel state proceedings indicate federal abstention
would further the interests of 'wise judicial administration,"' id. at 224
(quoting Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 818). Here, no federal constitutional
issue was involved. The local law issue concerning adequate storm drainage
was certainly complicated enough, but the court of appeals stated it was
merely a question of contract law that was without any "transcendental
importance." 976 F.2d at 224. Further, the court held that federal review
would not impinge on Virginia's effort to establish a coherent policy in land
use. Finally, the court of appeals held that the parallel state proceeding did
not preclude a federal action because the state case involved different parties
and legal arguments. Consequently, federal abstention was unwarranted.
In Neufeld v. City of Baltimore, 964 F.2d 347 (4th Cir. 1992), the Fourth
Circuit reversed the district court's granting of the motion to abstain. This
case involved the possible preemption of a local zoning ordinance regulating
television antennae by a regulation issued by the Federal Communications
Commission. The Fourth Circuit stressed that "abstention is the exception,
not the rule, and can only be justified in exceptional cases." 964 F.2d at 349
(citing Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S.
800, 813 (1976)). The Fourth Circuit held that this case was not exceptional
because: 1) it did not raise "difficult questions of state law involving peculiarly
local concerns," and 2) federal review would not "disrupt a coherent state
policy by subjecting the zoning ordinance to varying interpretations." Id. at
350.
In McLaughlin v. United Virginia Bank, 955 F.2d 930 (4th Cir. 1992),
the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of abstention. Twelve
lawsuits relating to this case were filed. The case in federal district court was
the eighth in the series, the rest being filed in state court. One might echo
the court's observation that there is a "complex, heatedly litigated series of
complaints, involving various combinations of parties, which are suspiciously
1993]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:211
fragmented." 955 F.2d at 935. One can understand the temptation to dismiss
the case via the abstention doctrine; the parties were already litigating in state
court and the federal proceedings were arguably duplicative. Although the
federal proceedings were duplicative, the court of appeals thought that
abstention was the wrong remedy. The relevant dictum states that the doctrines
of "res judicata, collateral estoppel, and equitable stay will help minimize
the potential for undue waste [of judicial resources in such cases]." Id. at
936. In other words, the problem of multiple litigation can be solved by
postponing action, letting the state court proceedings run their course, and
then using the doctrines of preclusion to get rid of the case.
IX. FEDERAL REmEDIES
Written by VISITING PROFESSOR ROBIN MORRIS-CoLLiN
Punitive Damages-Due Process
In Mattison v. Dallas Carrier Corp., 947 F.2d 95 (4th Cir. 1991), the
Fourth Circuit reviewed the constitutionality of South Carolina's scheme for
awarding punitive damages. South Carolina allows awards of punitive damages
to punish, deter, and vindicate the rights of a plaintiff whenever the conduct
of the defendant is willful, wanton or reckless. At the time of the trial, South
Carolina committed the amount of punitive damages to jury discretion subject
to post-trial review for excessiveness or appellate review under the abuse of
discretion standard. The trial court instructed the jury that the amount of
punitive damages "may be such sum as you believe will serve to punish that
defendant and deter others from like conduct." 947 F.2d at 100. The court
of appeals held that South Carolina's scheme as applied in federal court
deprived the defendant of due process of law under the Fifth Amendment
because the jury instructions based upon state substantive law violated the
constitutional minimum established in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v.
Haslip, 111 S. Ct. 1032 (1991)-the instruction did not contain limiting
factors for the jury's consideration such as proportionality of the punitive
damages to the harm caused and the net worth of the defendant. In Haslip,
the Supreme Court held a punitive damage award scheme in Alabama did
not deprive the defendant of federal due process, in part, because of careful
post-trial judicial review of the jury verdict. Further, the Fourth Circuit held
that state provisions for post-trial review which the court assumed might save
an otherwise unconstitutional scheme under Haslip could not be applied in a
federal court which was obliged to apply the federal procedural rules.
In the midst of the Mattison litigation, South Carolina altered its post-
trial review procedures adopting a multi-factored post-trial review scheme
which could include information not before the jury. In ordering a new trial
on the issue of punitive damages, the court observed that post-trial review
based upon evidence unavailable to the jury would be inconsistent with the
Seventh Amendment. Accordingly, the court directed that the South Carolina
standards for post-trial review be incorporated into jury instructions given in
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the federal district court, and further ordered a bifurcated proceeding to
avoid prejudice to the defendant.
In Johnson v. Hugo's Skateway, 974 F.2d 1408 (4th Cir. 1992), the
Fourth Circuit applied the same analysis to the question of whether Virginia's
punitive damage scheme, applied in federal court, provided the defendant
with due process. The court held that it did not, reversed the award of
punitive damages and remanded for a new trial of punitive damages. The
Fourth Circuit's majority opinion summarizing Pacific Mutual Life Insurance
Co. v. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. 1032 (1991) stated, "the almost de novo post-
verdict and appellate reviews conducted by Alabama's trial courts and the
Supreme Court of Alabama provided 'a sufficiently definite and meaningful
constraint on the discretion of Alabama fact finders in awarding punitive
damages' to satisfy due process." 974 F.2d at 1414 (quoting Haslip, 111 S.
Ct. at 1045). The majority pointed out that this was the interpretation applied
in Mattison v. Dallas Carrier Corp., 947 F.2d 95 (4th Cir. 1991), and under
this approach, Virginia's scheme, as it had been applied in the federal district
court, was constitutionally inadequate. In this case, the jury was instructed
under Virginia law that it was permitted to award punitive damages to punish
and to deter the defendants' conduct if the conduct was "maliciously or
wantonly or oppressively done." 974 F.2d at 1415. Further, it was instructed
that it might "add to the award of actual damages such amount as you shall
unanimously agree to be proper as punitive or exemplary damages," and
admonished that when deliberating it must fix the amount "with calm
discretion and sound reason ... [and never with] sympathy or bias or
prejudice." Id. Upon remand, the court of appeals again directed that jury
instructions incorporate additional factors such as proportionality that Vir-
ginia's common law included in the post-verdict review.
Five dissenters called upon the court to overrule Mattison as a misreading
of Haslip. They contended that the Alabama jury instructions in Haslip,
much like South Carolina's and Virginia's jury instructions, were tailored to
the goals of retribution and deterrence and fully met the constitutional
requirements of due process under Haslip. Post-verdict procedures, including
appellate review were additional but not necessary guarantees under Haslip.
Accordingly, the retrials and directions to incorporate additional jury guidance
were a mistaken interference at best, wrongly undermining the principles of
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), and Hanna v. Plumer,
380 U.S. 460 (1965).
Pending additional clarification of the Haslip methodology from the
Supreme Court, Fourth Circuit punitive damage awards will undoubtedly
continue to be the source of due process challenges from both plaintiffs
asking that Mattison be overruled, and defendants seeking the overturn of
large awards. Moreover, there will be some differences between state and
federal courq approaches to awarding punitive damages, including the question
of who will consider factors such as proportionality and defendant's net
worth. Under the federal court's approach, the jury will be instructed to
consider these factors, and in state courts judges will have control of these
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types of factors under their post-trial review procedures. The results may
indeed have the effect of encouraging forum shopping between state and
federal courts.
X. INCOME TAx
Reviewed by PROFSSOR J. TmoTrY PmEns
A. Burden of Proof
In Cebollero v. Commissioner, 967 F.2d 986 (4th Cir. 1992), the Fourth
Circuit upheld the Tax Court's finding that the taxpayer had not carried the
burden of proof in characterizing the Commissioner of Internal Revenue's
determination of a deficiency as arbitrary and excessive. The Commissioner
assessed a deficiency against the taxpayer for unreported income from a
liquor store business. The Commissioner determined the existence of a defi-
ciency, in part, by using the latest markup percentages on inventory stocked
by the taxpayer to calculate the income for the prior tax years-the tax years
under examination. The taxpayer initially told the Revenue Agent that he
had used the current year's markup percentages in the prior years. The
taxpayer changed his testimony at trial to say that he used lower markup
percentages in the prior years and thus had a lower profit than the Revenue
Agent computed. This, of course, would result in a lower profit than the
Commissioner computed.
The taxpayer argued that his trial testimony concerning the markup
percentages was sufficient to shift'the burden of proof to the Commissioner
and that the Tax Court erred in not shifting the burden. The Fourth Circuit
stated that in the first phase of a deficiency suit, the court must assess
whether the Commissioner's determination is arbitrary and excessive. In this
phase, the taxpayer bears the burden of proof by a preponderance of the
evidence. 967 F.2d at 990. However, if the taxpayer carries the burden of
showing the Commissioner's determination to be arbitrary, the Commission-
er's presumption of correctness vanishes, and the suit enters a second phase.
In this second phase of the suit, the court must determine the correct amount
of the deficiency, and the Commissioner bears the burden of proof. Id. In
the case at bar, the Fourth Circuit analyzed the first phase of the suit and
held that the taxpayer's own self-serving testimony regarding which markup
percentages he used in the years at issue did not establish a preponderance
of the evidence in his favor against the weight of his prior statements and
the Commissioner's computations. Thus, the Commissioner's assessment was
not arbitrary and excessive, and the suit did not enter the second phase.
B. Last Known Address
In Powell v. Commissioner, 958 F.2d 53 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 440 (1992), the Fourth Circuit reversed the Tax Court by holding that
the taxpayers filed their petition to the Tax Court within the requisite ninety-
day period after the mailing of the notice of deficiency because the Internal
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Revenue Service (IRS) did not exercise reasonable diligence in mailing the
notice to the taxpayers' last known address. The taxpayers moved from their
old address in late 1987. On February 29, 1988, the IRS sent the notice of
deficiency to the taxpayers' old address by certified mail. The Post Office
erroneously ignored the taxpayers' timely filed change of address forms and
returned the undelivered notice to the IRS. On December 26, 1988, the IRS
mailed a final notice of intention to levy to the taxpayers' new address. On
January 11, 1989, the taxpayers filed a petition with the Tax Court in order
to avoid payment of the deficiency prior to a determination on the merits.
The Tax Court dismissed the petition because the taxpayers filed it more
than ninety days after the mailing of the notice of deficiency.
The Fourth Circuit stated that the IRS's mailing of a notice of deficiency
is sufficient if the IRS mails the notice to the taxpayer's last known address.
The "last known address" is what, after the exercise of reasonable diligence,
the IRS may consider to be the address of the taxpayer on the date the IRS
mails the notice. 958 F.2d at 55. The Post Office's error of nondelivery made
the notice insufficient and the IRS's receipt of the undelivered notice showed
a lack of reasonable diligence in finding the last known address. Id. at 56.
Thus, the taxpayers' timely filed their petition and the Fourth Circuit re-
manded the case to the Tax Court where the Powells could contest the
asserted deficiency prior to the payment thereof.
The case indirectly provides a lesson for all taxpayers: Use registered or
certified return receipt mail in filing estimated payments, tax returns and all
other documents with the IRS. The registration or return receipt will provide
prima facie evidence of the fact that the taxpayer filed the item and of the
date of filing. I.R.C. § 7502(c) (1988); Treas. Reg. § 301.7502-1(d)(1) (as
amended in 1960). If the IRS had lost the Powell's return in the above case,
the Powells would have had a much more difficult time in court unless they
retained the registration or return receipt with respect to that return.
XI. SEcurrms REGULATION
Reviewed by PROFESSO. LYMAN P.Q. JOHNSON
A. Reliance on Oral Representations
In Myers v. Finkle, 950 F.2d 165 (4th Cir. 1991), the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that a determination of whether a
purchaser of securities may be justified in relying on oral representations that
conflict with contemporaneous written statements contained in a private
placement memorandum delivered to the investor requires a consideration of
eight relevant factors. These relevant factors include: (1) the sophistication
and expertise of the plaintiff in financial and securities matters; (2) the
existence of long standing business or personal relationships; (3) access to
relevant information; (4) the existence of a fiduciary relationship; (5) con-
cealment of the fraud; (6) the opportunity to detect fraud; (7) whether the
plaintiff initiated the stock transaction or sought to expedite the transaction;
and (8) the generality or specificity of the misrepresentations. Because no
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single factor is dispositive, consideration of all eight factors is necessary.
The court, presented with an unusual factual situation in which oral
representations were contradicted by express warnings in private placement
memoranda, stated that knowledge of information should be imputed to
investors who fail to exercise caution when they have in their possession
documents apprising them of the risks associated with the investments. In
short, investors are charged with constructive knowledge of the risks and
warnings contained in private placement memoranda. Therefore, in evaluating
the eight factors relevant to justifiable reliance, the conduct of investors must
be examined as if they had knowledge of all attendant warnings.
In Myers, the Fourth Circuit also discussed its interpretation of the
"sophistication" requirement. 950 F.2d at 167. The court stated that while
wealth alone may be an important factor in determining the sophistication
of an investor, it is not the dispositive factor. The court stated that other
criteria, such as age, education, professional status, investment experience,
and business background, may also be relevant in such determinations.
B. Fraud-Duty to Disclose
In Forston v. Winstead, McGuire, Sechrest & Minick, 961 F.2d 469 (4th
Cir. 1992), investors in a real estate limited partnership brought a securities
fraud suit against the syndicator of the securities offering, the general partners,
and the law firm retained by the general partners to prepare the tax opinions
for the offering memorandum. The Fourth Circuit held that under section
10b of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. section 78j(b), the
failure to disclose material information constitutes securities fraud only upon
proof of a duty to disclose. Looking to cases previously decided in the Fourth,
Fifth, and Seventh Circuits, the court stated that federal securities laws are
not themselves, with respect to the section 10b claim, the source of a duty
to disclose material facts. Thus, with respect to a section 10b claim, the duty
to disclose material facts arises only where there is some basis outside the
federal securities laws, such as, for example, a state law, for finding a
fiduciary or other confidential relationship.
The court found that such a duty to disclose material facts plainly ran
from the syndicator of the offering and the general partners. However, the
court questioned whether such a duty ran from the law firm. Appellants
argued that the law firm's duty to disclose arose under Texas common law,
a Treasury Department regulation, and an American Bar Association ethics
opinion. The court did not find merit in appellant's contentions. Appellants
further asked the court, in the absence of a duty grounded in law, to create
a duty of disclosure grounded in public policy-the policy of having law
firms monitor, on pain of liability, the representations that their clients make
to any third party. The court declined to accept this argument, stating that
the result of appellant's position would be a rigid rule charging all attorneys
who involve themselves in any facet of a commercial transaction with re-
sponsibility for the entire transaction. The court found that an "omnipresent"
duty of disclosure would not only be unfair to law firms, but would also
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destroy incentives for clients to be forthcoming with their attorneys and would
artificially inflate the cost of involving legal counsel in commercial transac-
tions. 961 F.2d at 475.

